By SNC Nwagu, FIICA, MNIIA
For nearly eight decades, the international system has operated largely under an American-led order. From Bretton Woods and the United Nations to NATO, the dominance of the US dollar, Silicon Valley and an unrivalled naval reach, the United States has shaped global finance, security, technology and governance. Today, that order faces its most serious strategic test since the Cold War. The question for Africa is not whether American power will disappear—it will remain a dominant military, technological and economic force for years to come. The real question is whether Africa will continue as an arena for rival powers, or become a strategic actor capable of shaping its own destiny.
The unipolar moment that followed the Soviet collapse is receding. Militarily, the United States still possesses unmatched capabilities. Yet the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the war in Ukraine, renewed instability in the Middle East and an expanding Indo-Pacific focus have exposed the rising costs and limits of sustaining global primacy on multiple fronts.
Economically, the dollar remains the principal reserve currency, about 57 percent of global official reserves, according to the IMF early-2026 COFER data—but its share has ticked down as central banks diversify and emerging economies pursue alternative payment arrangements. BRICS+, after recent expansion, now accounts for a larger share of global GDP measured by purchasing power parity than the G7. Politically, middle powers such as India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Indonesia are exercising greater strategic autonomy and preferring interest-based partnerships over fixed alignments.
These trends point not simply to multipolarity but to a multi-order world in which overlapping political, economic and security architectures coexist and compete.
Three broad geopolitical groupings are emerging. The Atlantic System—led by the United States and including the EU, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan and NATO allies—still dominates advanced technology, global finance and many multilateral institutions, even as internal disagreements over industrial policy, defence spending and China policy grow. The Eurasian System—centred on China and Russia—has deepened cooperation in infrastructure, energy, finance, technology and security, offering alternatives to Western arrangements. And a Strategic Middle made up of India, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, South Africa and Nigeria is asserting influence through strategic autonomy rather than permanent alignment.
Unlike the Cold War, today’s competition is driven less by ideology and more by control of technology, supply chains, energy, critical minerals, digital infrastructure and economic resilience.
This shifting landscape presents Africa with historic opportunities and grave risks. On the opportunity side, African states enjoy unprecedented bargaining power. China finances major infrastructure. The United States remains a key trade, investment and development partner. The EU is expanding industrial and climate partnerships. Gulf states, India, Türkiye and others are deepening commercial engagement. This plurality of partners gives African governments greater negotiating leverage than at any time since decolonisation.
Financial diversification is another opportunity. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), backed by the Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS), can increase local currency settlement for intra-African trade. While the dollar will remain indispensable globally, greater use of African payment systems can lower transaction costs, conserve foreign exchange and bolster resilience.
But the risks are real. Africa may become the principal theatre for intensified competition over critical minerals, digital infrastructure, maritime routes and political influence. Weak institutions could turn external rivalry into renewed dependency. Equally worrying is the persistent model of resource extraction without industrial transformation: exporting raw materials while importing high-value manufactured goods will keep African economies structurally subordinate.
Africa’s appropriate response is neither isolation nor passive alignment. It is Active Non-Alignment: engage all major powers where interests align, attach to none permanently, and deliberately build internal capacity across strategic sectors. Yet doctrine without execution is empty rhetoric. Strategic autonomy must be translated into concrete policy across five pillars for 2035.
1. Economic sovereignty as industrial policy. Governments should set measurable industrialisation targets for local processing of critical minerals, agro-processing and manufacturing. AfCFTA must be used to build regional value chains, underpinned by reliable energy, transport infrastructure and investment in productive capacity.
2. Financial sovereignty through integration. Fast-track AfCFTA implementation and wider PAPSS adoption. Central banks should expand local currency settlement arrangements, strengthen regional financial institutions and diversify reserve management.
3. Security sovereignty with institutional finance. The African Union and Regional Economic Communities should create sustainable, predictable funding for peace and security. The African Standby Force must become fully operational with interoperable capabilities and rapid deployment capacity.
4. Digital and data sovereignty as strategic infrastructure. African governments should jointly invest in sovereign cloud infrastructure, regional data centres, semiconductor capabilities where feasible, cybersecurity and African AI research. Public data must be governed by robust African legal and regulatory frameworks.
5. Diplomatic sovereignty through coordination. Africa should negotiate common positions on trade, climate, technology, finance and global governance while pressing for equitable representation, including permanent African seats on a reformed United Nations Security Council.
The American-led order has contributed to trade, growth, public health cooperation and institutional stability, but it also reflected unequal power relationships in which African priorities were often secondary. The emerging order will not automatically be fairer; it will intensify competition for African markets, minerals, technology and influence. Africa’s response must therefore be deliberate, coordinated and institutionally grounded.
The objective should not be to swap one external dominance for another. It is to build the institutional, economic, technological and security capacities that make strategic dependence optional rather than inevitable. The twenty-first century will favour regions that can produce, process, power, protect, innovate and govern themselves.
If the twentieth century was the century of political independence, the twenty-first must be the century of strategic sovereignty. The flag was raised in the 1960s. The responsibility now is to build the capacity that gives it meaning. Our goal is to end hegemony for Africa. By 2035, Africa must be the fourth pole in a four-pole world: US, China, EU, Africa.
Africa’s freedom is now or never.