By Sebastine Okafor, Ph.D
When the Nigerian Democratic Congress (NDC) was established earlier in 2026 after a long, protracted legal battle that resulted in a favourable judgment, which was not appealed by Nigeria’s electoral umpire, INEC, many did not see it as a viable opposition party due to the proximity between its establishment and the 2027 electoral timetable.
When questioned, the national leader of the party, Senator Seriake Dickson, stated that the establishment of the Nigerian Democratic Congress (NDC) was driven by the need to preserve Nigeria’s multi-party democracy and to provide what he described as a credible ideological alternative after he believed that the foundations of the PDP had been weakened and its ideals compromised. It was a vision with which few initially aligned immediately after its establishment, without any iota of doubt, as they saw it as a political party that stands for national unity, political inclusion, youth and women empowerment, and democratic values.
The party, on April 7, released a list of appointed Zonal Vice Chairmen across the six geopolitical zones before scheduling its congresses across the nation, which began in early May, before the entrance of Peter Gregory Obi and Senator Rabiu Musa Kwankwaso on May 3, 2026; a move seen by many as the lifeline of the political party, which could either make or mar the party.
Since the move took place, the party has somehow turned into an anti-democratic structure that has begun exposing issues that many did not previously observe. This has made many begin to question several decisions and actions the party has taken so far.
First, it scheduled its zonal congress to hold on May 6, 2026, but it was rumoured to have been shifted to May 9 and merged with the national convention, which did not take place. The NDC, as it stands, does not have any known zonal executives in the country, especially in the South-East region, where only one person appears to carry out the functions from the comfort of his room without any official office. Those who attended the national convention can attest to the fact that the party did not conduct any zonal congress affirmations on that day. The party also failed to disclose the names of elected national officers during the convention, which left many stunned, as there was no announcement of individuals elected into offices such as the National Publicity Secretary and the National Youth Leader. What surprised many further was the party’s announcement on May 17 that it had appointed Barr. Osa Director as its National Publicity Secretary, alongside Peter Agbo Ekele and Lawal Sambo as his deputies. This was another shocking anti-democratic error by the party. The appointment of deputy National Publicity Secretaries is not provided for in the party’s constitution, especially Article 12.2.3 (Page 23). A party established to correct the anti-democratic practices of the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) cannot appear to be practising the very actions it intends to oppose.
Another concern observed in the party’s activities is the powers allocated to the office of the National Leader. According to Article 11.3 of the constitution (Page 17), it states:
“The office of National Leader of the Party is hereby established.
The National Leader of the party shall be a member of the Central Working Committee of the party, holding the office of Chairman of the Central Working Committee.
He shall be the National Leader of the party.
He shall be the head of every delegation of the party to which he is a member.
He shall advise and guide the party on policy formulation.
He shall, in all circumstances where he feels the need to do so, lead efforts at the resolution of any crisis, dispute or conflict at any level within the party.
He shall work to ensure compliance by all officers and members of the party with all directives of the Central Working Committee and the NEC of the party.”
In Article 17, Page 51 of the party’s constitution, it further appears to expose the party to a one-man structure by stating that:
“The Founder/National Leader shall hold the office of National Leader of the party for a period of ten years in the first instance (calculated from the date of registration of NDC by INEC), and except where he exercises discretion not to continue in office at the end of the first term, he shall assume office for a second and final term of ten years, calculated from the date of expiration of the first tenure.”
What this implies is that the National Leader, who clocked 60 in January 2026, potentially has up to 20 years of leadership influence. If so, he may retire only at an advanced age while still serving as the National Leader.
Aside from the early structural concerns already raised, a closer reading of the Nigerian Democratic Congress (NDC) 2026 Constitution reveals deeper institutional tensions that could affect internal democracy, transparency, and fair political competition within the party.
A major concern lies in the expansive discretionary powers concentrated at the top of the party hierarchy, particularly within the Central Working Committee (CWC). The constitution states that the CWC shall “suspend any member of the Working Committee of the party at any level” and also “dissolve any Working Committee of the party at any level.” While internal discipline is necessary in political organisations, the absence of clearly stated procedural safeguards—such as independent review panels, timelines for hearings, or appeal guarantees—creates room for arbitrary enforcement of disciplinary actions. This structure risks turning disciplinary mechanisms into political tools against internal dissent.
Furthermore, the National Executive Committee (NEC) is empowered to “dissolve a State Executive Committee where necessary, and appoint a Caretaker Committee.” Although the provision limits caretaker arrangements to three months, the constitution does not define what constitutes “where necessary.” In practice, such vague wording often becomes a trigger for frequent dissolutions of elected structures, weakening the autonomy of state chapters and reducing accountability to grassroots members.
In several states, emerging reports of caretaker-style administrations replacing elected structures without clearly conducted congresses raise concerns about compliance with the constitutional requirement that state organs be elected through congress processes. For instance, Articles 12.7 and 12.8 clearly establish that state congresses “elect officers of the Party at the State level,” while the State Working Committee must function as “the principal executing organ of the State Congress.” Where these congresses are delayed, merged, or substituted with appointments, the legitimacy of such state leadership structures becomes questionable.
Another area of concern is the growing perception of parallel or informal selection structures operating alongside constitutional organs. While the constitution allows the CWC to “create new organs or committees of the party,” this power appears broad enough to permit the establishment of ad hoc bodies that may influence candidate selection or delegate appointments outside established congress channels. If such committees are used to predetermine outcomes of primaries or delegate lists, it directly undermines Article 15 on party primaries, which presupposes competitive, regulated, and transparent procedures.
The issue becomes more pronounced when considered alongside Article 12.4.1 (x) and (xi), which grant the National Working Committee the power to “organize and conduct all congresses and conventions of the party at all levels,” including “the election of candidates of the party for all elections.” This centralisation of electoral administration within one organ creates a structural imbalance where the same body responsible for party administration also controls candidate selection. Without independent electoral panels or neutral supervisory mechanisms, internal primaries risk being perceived as predetermined exercises.
At zonal and ward levels, there are also concerns about uneven implementation of congress guidelines. The constitution provides for structured participation at every level, including ward congresses made up of “all duly registered card-carrying members.” However, in practice, allegations in some areas suggest restricted accreditation processes and selective invitation of delegates, which contradict the inclusive membership principle embedded in Article 10, which guarantees equal participation and voting rights for registered members.
The tenure arrangement for the National Leader also raises governance concerns. Article 17 provides for a potentially extended leadership period of up to twenty years, renewable under certain conditions. While long-term continuity may provide stability, it also raises questions about leadership rotation, internal competition, and generational inclusion in party leadership.
Moreover, several critical questions arise for objective observers regarding the operational guidelines of the NDC. These include: How independent are state and zonal congresses if caretaker committees can replace elected structures without clearly defined thresholds for intervention? What safeguards exist to prevent the CWC from using its power to dissolve committees as a political correction tool rather than a disciplinary measure? If the National Working Committee controls both administration and candidate selection processes, who arbitrates disputes arising from contested primaries? Are ad hoc committees being used to indirectly determine outcomes of congresses or delegate lists, contrary to the spirit of Articles 12.1 and 15? What mechanisms exist for ordinary members to challenge decisions taken by higher organs without fear of suspension under broad disciplinary provisions?
Taken together, these structural patterns suggest that while the constitution of the NDC contains formal democratic language and multi-layered governance organs, its practical operation could tilt heavily toward centralised control unless strict internal checks, transparent implementation, and independent dispute-resolution mechanisms are actively enforced.